This paper presents a review of the state-of-the-art of risk assessment as it applies to the hull structures of FPSOs. Risk definitions are examined critically to determine how they should be applied in this case. The roles of human and organisational errors and their proper identification during design of intact and damage scenarios are discussed. It has long been accepted that FPSOs and trading tankers are subject to different environmental loading conditions. Even more substantial differences become evident when operating practices are examined and it is realised that to manage risk properly these differences need to be reflected in design and the preparation of operation procedures.
INTRODUCTION
Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessels have gained popularity in recent years, where the economics of deepwater petroleum production have mitigated against fixed platforms and pipelines. Changes in the oil transportation market, particularly the mandatory phasing out of single hull tankers, have made converted tankers the vessel of choice for many FPSO applications. Besides the usual engineering challenges associated with transforming a trading tanker to a permanently moored offshore facility with on-board production equipment, there are new questions relating to the adequacy of the design from safety and environmental protection points of view. The hull structures of FPSOs will experience environmental and operational loads for which tankers were not designed, and many are being placed in service, not as new vessels, but as structures which have seen some degree of wear and tear, consisting mostly of corrosion and fatigue. In addition, trading tankers are designed and equipped to transport oil safely from one place to another; as huge stationary floating structures, they pose a different set of hazards and potential consequences should something go wrong. Since the operational history of FPSOs is not nearly as extensive as that for ships or offshore platforms, the principles of risk analysis are well suited to consider the various aspects and uncertainties associated with the design and operation of FPSOs. The tools provide the owners, regulators, and other interested parties with the means to make decisions and satisfy themselves of the adequacy and fitness for service of proposed FPSO designs from the standpoints of safety, pollution prevention, and economics.
ABS has published Guidance Notes on Risk Assessment Application for the Marine and Offshore Oil and Gas Industries [1] to help managers and technical professionals understand the merits, challenges, technology, and regulatory aspects of risk assessment as a useful tool in the design and approval process. In simple terms risk can be defined as the product of frequency and consequence, where frequency is expressed as the number of undesirable events per unit time, and consequence is the number of people affected, the amount of spillage, the economic impact, etc. per event.
It follows that risk can have different definitions and units depending on the consequence under consideration. Single events can result in multiple consequences, including loss of life, pollution, direct costs, and indirect costs. In some cases a particular consequence might be considered absolutely unacceptable, in which case the event should be designed out of the system. In other cases, it may be deemed that the cost or difficulty of preventing or mitigating a particular consequence is so large that the consequence must be accepted to some degree. In such cases, the effort may focus on reducing the frequency of a potential event to an acceptably improbable level. Attempts are often made to quantify risk, but it should be recognised that the degree of success in that endeavour depends largely on the ability to make accurate and informed assessments of possible events, event frequencies, and potential consequences.
Risk is usually considered as a way to rank "undesirable events." Although this might seem a self-evident term, care is required in applying it to an FPSO structure. Exceeding yield stress may be considered undesirable in some circumstances while in others it is essential to the functionality of the structure as a whole. Panel buckling, 'excessive' deformation of a structural component and rupture/puncture will normally be accepted as undesirable events. These are even less desirable for an FPSO if they require offshore repair or temporary loss of service (but these aspects may be accounted in terms of higher consequence factors).
Experience shows that formal risk analyses can be dominated by extremely high consequence events that occur as a result of a chain of actions and occurrences with low and per-haps grossly uncertain probabilities. One approach to tackling this problem may be to use a qualitative assessment to identify catastrophic events and to implement separate procedures for dealing with them as distinct from assessments that might be implemented routinely for components or subsystems with non-catastrophic failure modes. Thus, having identified a potential source of catastrophic failure it would seem appropriate to investigate whether it can be avoided; minimised; substituted with a lesser hazard; controlled; or mitigated against before proceeding with a more elaborate evaluation.
Historical records of total system failures suggest that human and organisational errors (HOE) are liable to account for up to 80% of the causes, Bea, [2] . For this reason, the sources of such errors need to be examined fully.
Normal FPSO design procedures distinguish between intact and damaged conditions. Intact assessments normally are based on extreme environmental parameters, such as a storm with a 100 year return period. If the damage event is statistically independent of environmental events, the extreme environmental event and the damage event are unlikely to occur simultaneously, so the damage assessment may assume more frequent and less severe environmental conditions. However, a damage condition can only be treated in this way provided it is not caused by the extreme event and it is repaired in good time or some compensating action taken. Decreasing operational draft and reducing design storage capacity, for example, are possible compensating actions for a damaged FPSO. This paper focuses on intact design conditions and identification of credible damage scenarios. Risk analysis must address these and consider any immediate responses or actions following the occurrence of damage.
In implementing a risk assessment of an FPSO structure design, it is important to recognise that there are many different hull configurations and that each is liable to be more vulnerable to some hazards than to others. Risks to the FPSO hull structure will also be strongly affected by topside processing facilities and the extent to which topsides and hull equipment such as power generation, cargo handling and general utilities are integrated. Topside operating risks (for example the need to protect operators and crew from green water events) may result in draft restrictions for the hull, which may lead to more severe motion response, greater preponderance of keel slamming and increased rates of fatigue damage. Despite similarities in outward appearance, there is little correspondence between the design and operational demands on a tanker and an FPSO, and all attempts to reduce cost or design effort that are based on apparent parallels between these vessels should be examined closely.
During FPSO design there may be strong project reasons for wishing to consider hull and topsides design separately, but once the project reaches the fabrication and operational stages, hull and topsides have to operate together and should be so considered. Interfaces and strong interdependencies may emerge that need to be properly recognised in any risk assessment.
RISK IN DESIGN -HUMAN AND ORGANISATIONAL ERRORS
The 1996 Ship Structures Symposium, held by the Society of Naval Architects and Marine Engineers, contains several papers on 'Human and Organisational Errors in Marine Structures' some of which consider whether HOEs can be categorised and dealt with in design. Papers by Bea [2] and Boniface and Bea [3] are highly relevant. Bea [2] provides classifications of HOE which are useful to the design process and those involved in it. Guidance is provided on the ways that can be utilised to quantify and analyse HOE. Three methods are discussed: Qualitative Quantitative Combined -Safety Indexing Method "The qualitative approach does not attempt to capture details of the systems and processes. Rather it focuses on a general evaluation…attempts to identify critical elements…and how they might be improved. Given the extremely complex and frequently irrational nature of the systems and processes that are involved in the life-cycle of ship-type structures, the qualitative approach offers significant advantages." Particularly, it allows HOEs to be incorporated in the review process.
A quantitative approach is generally utilised for higher consequence systems and processes. However, for ill-defined systems, particularly those involving complex HOE interactions, the reality of the results may be questionable.
In the third approach, linguistic variables are translated into numerical variables and a mathematical process is provided to perform calculations of effects and variables. This method appears to offer advantages in the evaluation of HOE in the life-cycle of ship structures , but at the time it was less well developed. The approach requires an identification of priorities or hierarchy of concerns and the evaluation of their relative safety.
Integration of experience, insights and judgement of those that have direct experience is critical! A generalised risk assessment for FPSO hull structure design was implemented within P A F A with an experienced in-house team to distil and summarise many man-years of experience and make it available as check lists. Three checklists resulted: 1) Sources of human and organisational errors 2) Experience and knowledge of system and component failures on FPSOs 3) Damage and accidental load cases.
These have been supplemented by items from a recent review of historical data from the UK Health and Safety Executive [4] and some sample output is presented below.
Major contributions to HOE within the review group's experience in this area are presented in table 1. Other contributions were identified relating to system interactions, fabrication and operation. Management needs to be alert to these dangers and implement processes to guard against them. Table 2 contains a summary of some of the main areas that have contributed to component and system failures. More details of typical failures were presented in the work submitted to ABS. Here it seems appropriate to identify and discuss only a few; shuttle collisions, green water and change in direction of environmental load.
EXPERIENCE OF FAILURES AND ACCIDENT LOAD CASES
Shuttle collisions: Accidental collisions between offshore installations and attendant, floating vessels need to be taken into consideration during design.
Despite precautions, mistakes or equipment failures can occur and an occasional collision seems inevitable. For this reason, fixed structures are designed to sustain certain levels of impact energy (typically 14MJ) from collision with a supply vessel. There has been no equivalent requirement regarding impact between an FPSO and a shuttle tanker (although shuttles are known to suffer relatively frequent damage from collisions with loading buoys). Several incidents have been registered in recent years and work is now under way to identify an appropriate design requirement. The horizontal collision velocity between a properly controlled shuttle tanker and an FPSO will be very low and hence the design value of impact energy might be correspondingly low. However, this ignores the relative vertical velocity between the bow of the shuttle and the stern of the FPSO. Impact energy of the order of 140MJ (or greater) is possible for vertical motion under normal operating conditions and there is little that the masters of either vessel can do to reduce it. Such collisions could cause breaches of watertight integrity and this has been reported in at least one recent incident. Clearly, hazardous equipment such as high-pressure gas piping or compressors should not be sited in vulnerable areas. More vigilance and training might prevent collisions but this is difficult since tandem loading is a complex operation for each unique installation and dependent on the systems and crews on both vessels.
Green water:
A report for the UK Health and Safety Executive [5] identified 17 green water incidents on 12 FPSO/FSU installations on the UK Continental Shelf (UKCS) and the Norwegian shelf between 1995 and 2000. For many of these installations inadequate provision had been made for green water during design and consequently damage to access ways, equipment, pipework, cabling and deckhouse structures occurred in many cases. Lack of appreciation of the likely severity of such incidents (many installations could be subject to more than 6m of green water at the bow or at the side) represents a failure during the design process. All operators in the North Sea have now undertaken a review of the vulnerability of their vessels to these incidents to ensure that safety critical, sensitive or hazardous equipment is protected. It is interesting to note that susceptibility to green water damage was not detected even for projects in which model tests had been organized, partly because test conditions which might have revealed the sensitivity were not identified. Examination of test records showed that some incidents had been present in original results but these had gone unrecognized. One operator noted that shipyards tend to provide much stronger and heavier protection for deck equipment since, historically, decks are expected to ship water at some time. Traditional 'topside' designers often miss this possibility. There are indications, [21] , that damaging green water incidents are also experienced in less exposed locations.
Change in direction of environmental load:
Several installations and associated operations have been shown to be vulnerable to change in direction of environmental load, particularly when this occurs rapidly. If a vessel's heading is maintained with thruster assistance, care must be exercised that the thrusters have sufficient capacity to change the heading for a wide range of heading angles and for a full range of environmental load effects. As a vessel's heading angle increases, the moment needed to turn its head back against the weather increases rapidly. If the environmental load can increase or change direction rapidly, the moment capacity of the thrusters may be exceeded and the vessel may be caught broadside to a rising storm -and the associated extreme loads and roll responses. Proper design of heading control relies on a thorough appreciation of all environmental loads, their magnitudes, directions and rates of change.
Historical data from North Sea operations, Reference [4] , indicate that the three most common causes of operational incidents arise from leakages from piping systems (1.64 occurrences per unit year), cranage and falling objects (1.51) and fires (0.29). Table 3 lists many of the damage and accidental load cases that are normally included in FPSO design. A few pertinent comments are included by way of additional information but these are not complete.
Vinnem et al., Reference 6, present another risk assessment implemented for one of the earliest North Seabased FPSOs that attempts to utilise operational experience from tankers and apply it to the main safety aspects of an FPSO. Actions to address the above will lead to direct improvements in the strength of some structural components of the hull. These may also increase structural strength and contribute to robustness against common errors and operational mishaps. Including hatches, down flooding points and access spaces that may only be submerged in exceptional circumstances.
Hydrostatic stability
Including when damage occurs to any two compartments adjacent to the perimeter of the vessel.
Sounding systems
Ensure that severe load conditions can not be caused by faulty readings from the tank sounding system. Mooring system Can vessel survive (at minimum) failure of one mooring line? Check that the vessel will not adopt an unacceptable orientation and that the structure can sustain the redistributed loads and any transient motion following the failure.
Turret systems
Check consequences of failure of turret systems. The structure should be capable of sustaining particular load combinations and a prescribed range of environmental forces when turret rotation is prevented. Offloading systems Studies should be implemented to ensure the vessel could continue to operate safely despite damage to or malfunction of the loading system. Spillage of oil Evaluate environmental damage for a range of oil spill scenarios. Specify counter pollution actions to be implemented if acceptance criteria are exceeded. In many tankers, bunker fuel tanks are not protected by a double-skin arrangement. Extra structural protection or operational restrictions may be necessary if cranage or supply operations imply increased risk of oil-spill.
NORMAL RISK ASSESSMENT FOR SHIP HULL STRUCTURES

Global longitudinal loading
Since global failure of the hull of an FPSO would have such severe consequences, it seems appropriate to quantify the probability of failure through reliability analysis. Numerous papers have been written on the application of reliability methods to the general problem of, particularly, global bending and, less so, shear strength of a ship's hull girder. Parunov and Senjanovic [8] and Frieze [9] provide up-to-date reviews of the state-of-the-art and the findings of earlier projects. However, many studies have been centred around trading tankers and there are many differences between such vessels and FPSOs. HSE/Faulkner [10] , Kaminski [7] , Frieze et al [11] , Shi and Frieze [12] , Wang et al [13] and Hai-Hong and Bai [14] were found which specifically dealt with the structural reliability of FPSOs. More general comments about the status of research in related areas are contained in the proceedings of the 13 th and 14 th Ship and Offshore Structures Congresses, 1997 and 2000, References 15-18.
All of these references consider the longitudinal strength and reliability of the mid-ship section of an FPSO. They follow broadly similar approaches and borrow from each other in different areas of the calculations. Differences in detail reflect different operation procedures among various FPSOs. Reference [14] extends the calculations to consider hull girder degradation with time under the effects of corrosion and fatigue.
The major load effects considered are wave-induced bending, still water bending, statistical combination of these load effects and the variability of each. Reference 10 puts these calculations in historical perspective and provides a detailed review of the dynamic load estimation methods used in [15] . The load calculations, the comparisons made with available full scale measurements that are reported in [11] , and the deduction of typical biases that need to be applied to the results of linear analyses are among the most extensive available within open literature and these data are adopted as input for most of the other references. However, rather than provide another critique of the methods, perhaps it is most appropriate, in the present discussion, to examine some the failure probabilities that are deduced. Probabilities of failure under sagging determined by the quoted references are presented in table 5.
The probability of failure increases by an order of magnitude when simultaneous wave and still water bending maxima are considered. Reference 13 accounts for slam loading (see below) as one component of the general non-linear hydrodynamic loading and points out that their assessment of failure due to sagging is higher than that due to hogging partly because of the significantly enhanced non-linear contributions to the sagging moments. However, the inclusion of slam loading does not appear to have had such a large effect on the failure probabilities that it stands out from the other results. As previous but including corrosion
Most of the quoted results ignore deterioration in hull strength with time due to corrosion, fatigue and wear-and-tear. [10] and [14] examine time dependent reliability due to various levels of corrosion. In [12] uniform rates of corrosion are applied throughout, while [14] applies different rates of corrosion to different plates and corner elements, depending on their locations. Wang [35] also summarises the findings of sensitivity studies into the effect of plate and stiffener thickness on ultimate hull girder capacity that could be used to assess the likely affects of corrosion. [14] incorporates the effects of two different types of crack on hull strength. One crack propagates away from the stiffener in a transverse direction, decreasing the width of the attached plating, and the other propagates across the web stiffener decreasing the web height. The net area of stiffened panel available to carry longitudinal stress is dependent on crack size and corrosion rate. Both references illustrate a steady decline in reliability due to uniform degradation, but [14] also reveals sudden decreases when cracks in the deck plate propagate in an unstable manner.
When minor damage has occurred, it becomes important to determine the ultimate strength and reliability of an ageing structure taking into account strength reduction and load shedding following denting. Hu et al, [20] present basic data about load shortening curves for stiffened panels including 'asbuilt', 'deformed' and 'damaged' specimens.
Slamming is a non-linear hydrodynamic load and a recognised load case for ships particularly if their draft is such as to allow frequent keel emergence. Classification societies normally treat slam as a local load case (see below) and provide empirical data accordingly. Slam on the bow can also cause a whipping response in the hull girder that causes a high frequency component of the mid-ship bending moment. Reference [17] incorporates this in the derivation of the biases it applies.
Global design against transverse loading
The most extensive study of the design of transverse frames against wave loading is contained in Wang, [22] and [13] . These papers report ultimate strength analyses and compare ultimate load factors and probabilities of failure depending on the application of DNV recommendations for trading vessels or FPSOs. The annual probabilities of failure corresponding to 100 year characteristic values are in the order 10 -6 if merchant ship rules are applied but in the order of 10 -8 if production vessel rules are applied.
Several comments seem in order:
1) The latter figures are much lower than those ascribed to double hull tankers (below). 2) Given that FPSOs may be held at some direction to the weather for other operational reasons, the dynamic pressures due to vessel roll used in [13] may need to be increased. 3) Buchner [23] indicates a significant non-linear component in wave pressure which becomes significant aft of the mid ship section. This may also increase the pressure loading on the transverse frames.
Given the extremely low probabilities of failure reported in [13] , perhaps it is not surprising that this particular reliability analysis has not been examined more extensively. However, given the indicated increases in pressure loads and anecdotal reports of increased fatigue damage (See following), perhaps this calculation needs to be revisited, with corrosion and fatigue effects also being examined in a similar manner to [14] . Finally, [22] comments that a frame failure does not seem to lead to a catastrophic failure scenario (although ultimately hull integrity relies on the transverse frames maintaining the hull shape).
Local design against hydrostatic pressure loads
The local loads to be considered in probability-based ship design are as follows: a) Still water loads (external static load) b) Wave frequency loads (external hydrodynamic pressure due to waves and vessel response to waves) c) High frequency slamming loads (external pressure).
(See above) d) Cargo inertia loads -increased internal pressure due to vessel accelerations e) Liquid sloshing loads (internal loads due to liquid impact in a slack tank)
The side shell will also be vulnerable to impact loads due to ship and supply boat impacts and, in the region of the cranes, to damage caused by swinging loads.
Chen et al [24] , in their extensive evaluation of double hull tanker structures indicate probabilities of failure for the local strength of mild steel scantlings, reduced for corrosion, against pressure (only) as 0.023 for plating, 0.008 for stiffeners and 0.023 for girders. However, these evaluations are based on the environment experienced by trading vessels and may be of limited application to an FPSO. One paper by Lee et al [36] , implies that slam-induced, plastic deformation of bow plate, stiffeners and frames of trading tankers may be a more frequent occurrence than has previously been acknowledged, even when design in compliance with Rule requirements has been fully implemented. A recent damage incident to the bow of the Schiehallion FPSO indicates that extremely high pressures may be generated in storms that are much less severe than the 100 year design storm. More research is required to identify appropriate slam design events if the occurrences of this type of damage are to be understood and evaluated.
Since most FPSOs are moored, one might expect slamming loads to be that much lower than for a tanker and hence of little consequence to an FPSO hull design. However some care is required in the assessment of slam loads in two respects. First, the range of validity of empirical formulations adopted by classification societies does not include very low forward speeds. Hence, in applying these formulations, it is necessary to use a minimum speed in the calculation even though it may be substantially higher than any realistic forward speed associated with an FPSO. Secondly, an FPSO cannot avoid storms and therefore must be capable of withstanding wave slam from rarely occurring steep waves. It is becoming clear that steep-fronted waves, not necessarily high waves, can induce large slam forces and are less rare than had once been assumed. A recent DNV revision to their classification rules also applies a substantial pressure increase "to account for the 100 year probability" and the fact that most FPSOs can not avoid severe storms.
Research into the probability of occurrence of steep waves and the associated risks from the slam loads they may induce is still in hand, Buchner et al [21] . Care should be exercised if a turret is supported on a cantilever at the bow or stern since the increased relative velocity between wave and structure in these areas can induce very high slam loads. This is an area in which it may be necessary to examine the meaning of the term "undesirable event" to develop an effective design methodology. A certain amount of plastic deformation may be acceptable in the design against rare, extremely high, slam pressures provided that it can be shown there is no significant risk of progressive collapse in subsequent storms. It would also be necessary to demonstrate that these events could not cause rupture of the plate or a weld since such damage would be expensive to repair in-situ. Note that the naval architecture requirements for watertight integrity and damage stability ought to prevent a single plate rupture from escalating into a catastrophic damage scenario.
RISKS ARISING FROM SPECIFIC FPSO-HULL STRUCTURE CONFIGURATIONS
There are several load effects that are particularly important for FPSOs.
Fatigue
Fatigue is a more serious issue for FPSO hull configurations than it appears to be for trading tankers. The frequent changes in cargo and ballast conditions (and associated changes in draft and trim), the continuous exposure to wave forces and the inability to avoid severe weather increase the rates of fatigue damage. To minimise the needs for repair, material selection and control of weld procedures need to be initiated from the start of fabrication. To allow an on-going process of inspection on an operational vessel, specific consideration of ballast sequences and associated hull bending moments need to have been examined thoroughly during design.
The Technical Committee III.2 of the International Ship and Offshore Structures Congress [37] , provides an up-to-date overview of many of the issues underlying, currently-accepted standard fatigue calculations (see Barltrop [38] ) and their application to the hull structures of ships. Despite the fact that many of the steps taken and techniques adopted are widely accepted in the engineering community, it is clear that they are on-going subjects for extended research projects. Francois et al, [39] provided an insight into some of the difficulties inherent in the application of the 'standard method' across the certifying authorities. This last paper also begins the process of comparing a range of fatigue load calculation findings and measurements for mid-ship deck strains. There are substantial discrepancies between strain calculations and measurements at the mid-ship side shell and between calculations and measurements of local side pressure towards the front of the ship, even in 'pure' head seas.
Coggan et al [40] also provides a simplified assessment of fatigue in the side shell of an FPSO. In the comparison with similar assessments by other consultants, there is an order of magnitude spread in the results of the fatigue assessment.
Given the general nature of these results, it would be wise to acknowledge the likelihood of substantial discrepancies between any fatigue calculation model and reality. [39] also draws attention 'the magnitude and complexity of this type of analysis. Advanced hydrodynamic and structural analysis software must be coupled with powerful computing resources so that large models with many load cases may be processed.' In implementing these procedures, there is significant potential for errors and a high level of scrutiny is required to arrive at consistent, valid results. The above need careful consideration in assessing the 'probability of an undesirable event' in any risk assessment of design against fatigue damage.
Garbatov and Guedes Soares [41] provides a reliability analysis procedure that can be applied to the assessment of reliability due to cracks in the welded joints of tanker side shells. With appropriate adjustments and attention to detail, this method could be extended to the case of an FPSO. However, one must question the failure criterion adopted in the paper, namely, the growth of a crack beyond a prescribed limit. It is clear from inspection reports on tankers that vessels can continue to operate for a considerable time with some level of fatigue damage. Load shedding into other structural elements prevents a catastrophic collapse.
Although fatigue crack initiation does not discriminate between steels with different mechanical properties, suitable hull materials must be selected with improved fracture initiation toughness and crack arresting properties. Still et al [42] and Still and Speck [43] describe experience of procurement of the Triton FPSO. They describe the steps that were taken from interception of a 'build-slot' with a fabricator, to ensure that appropriate steel, adequate weld materials and suitable weld procedures were adopted which were appropriate to the intended operating environment of the hull.
Entering a confined space on any operational oil tanker is a hazardous job and prime consideration needs to be given to safety and access for the inspection teams. Attention needs to be given to any risk of through thickness cracking, whether in the wall of a cargo tank or an internal piping arrangement since these could introduce inert or poisonous gases into the working space of an inspection team.
Turret load effects
The turret is the interface for transmitting environmental loads on the vessel into the moorings and is also the most likely location for the terminations of the risers. The vertical load in the turret will be a combination of weight (including any deck structure mounted on the turret), buoyancy (some turret arrangements provide an important contribution to the hull buoyancy while others operate with a moderate moonpool arrangement), inertial effects due to hull motion, fluid pressure, mooring pretension, mooring loads and riser restraining loads. Normally a number of cases will need to be considered to establish the extreme mooring loads. Goodwin et al [25] , Chahrabati et al [26] , Ormberg et al [27] and Nishimoto et al [28] relate to the assessment of mooring loads, but these will not be discussed at length here. Note that an appropriate analysis needs to consider both loads due to intact and damaged mooring systems. It seems to be important to account for wave-current interaction in assessing the second order drift loads, Martins et al [29] . Surge damping is also important and may have significant contributions arising from mooring interactions with the sea bed and the drag forces on both mooring lines and risers, Roveri [30] . Important savings are realised if the combined effects of vessel motions, moorings and risers are assessed rather than by performing separate analysis for each of these systems. Fachetti et al [31] provide discussion of the structural design requirements for a turret in a converted tanker, relevant to the type of load conditions that arise in deep water offshore Brasil. Even in this relatively mild climate, it is noted that it is necessary to consider deformations in the hull structure so that the bearing supports are sufficiently rigid to match the limits specified by the bearing manufacturer.
Issues relating to topside support
Where substantial process equipment is required on an FPSO, it will generally be mounted on process decks several metres above the tank tops and the associated weight, environmental and inertial loads will need to be transmitted into the main frames of the vessel. These loads need to be properly accounted for in the strength and fatigue assessment of the hull. Proper account needs to be taken of the heading of the vessel relative to the both waves and swell, since substantial rolling motions can cause significantly increases in the loads in the support stools.
It is important to recognise that the hull of a large vessel undergoes substantial deflections under variable cargo loading and the action of waves, particularly those that are approximately the same length as the hull. These deflections affect any stools supporting the process decks and consequently important interaction loads are introduced in these structures unless specific action is taken to reduce them.
Partial load conditions
An FPSO or FSU will normally need to cope with continuous production and intermittent off-loading. This will have two major effects in contrast to normal tanker operation, and therefore, special efforts may be required to manage associated risks. First, because of the nature of the loading and unloading cycle, it will be necessary to continually monitor the load condition and adjust the ballast system. This will impose a need for greater reliability of all systems associated with cargo and ballast movement and monitoring. Second, because of the varying level of fluid in each tank and the continuously variable draft, trim and heel of the vessel, different areas of the internal tanks structure and the external hull will be subjected to maximum dynamic fluid loading at any particular time. Consequently, a larger area of the structure may be exposed to extreme fluid loading whether due to sloshing (internally) or wave slam (externally). The range of dynamic loading may also lead to more rapid fatigue accumulation over a wider area of the structure. Several of the papers reviewed (Kim et al [32] , Lee [33] and Umemoto et al, [34] ) discuss methods of predicting loads due to sloshing in partially full tanks. [33] draws attention to the extremely high pressure loads which can occur as a result of sloshing and the need for an appropriately sophisticated structural analysis to make sense of the stresses generated in bulkheads in resisting these loads. [34] is an analysis which is more specifically targeted at double hull vessels, which are used for many modern FPSOs. It is pointed out that many double-hulled tankers have very little internal structure in the cargo tanks. This can lead to severe sloshing conditions in the tanks.
CONCLUSIONS
This review highlights once more the significant differences between the loads and operational requirements that apply to the structure of an FPSO and to that of a trading tanker. It would appear that qualitative risk assessment has an important role to play in the identification and assessment of appropriate design procedures for the many components and systems that must be integrated to achieve a successful design. Quantitative risk assessment is more difficult to apply consistently because of the inherent complexity of an FPSO, but it may have an important role in the full assessment of catastrophic damage scenarios.
